BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds (CAHHM) cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings (IFs). The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants (...) (mean age 58 ± 9 years, 54% women) were recruited with a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants (40% response rate) at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% (95% confidence interval 7.7–8.9%) of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain (4.2%) and abdomen (3.1%). The majority of participants (97%) informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants (90%) would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship is increasingly studied as a fundamental and foundational economic phenomenon. It has, however, received less attention as an ethical phenomenon. Much contemporary business ethics assumes its core application purposes to be (1) to stop predatory business practices and (2) to encourage philanthropy and charity by business. Certainly predation is immoral and charity has a place in ethics, neither should be the first concerns of ethics. Instead, business ethics should make fundamental the values and virtues of entrepreneurs - i.e., those (...) self-responsible and productive individuals who create value and trade with others to win-win advantage. (shrink)

This Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy for 1966 is concerned to exhibit the basis of Kant's deontological moral theory and primacy-warranting of practical over theoretical reason. One would have thought this had been done often enough, but Warnock has apparently not benefited from past attempts. For his effort to undermine both of Kant's contentions and push in a utilitarian direction is based on an unsympathetic and unprobing manipulating of the key terms in the theory: freedom, reason, virtue. For example, (...) Warnock cites the historical influence of Rousseau on Kant in the matter of stressing the primacy of practical reason but fails to note the deeper connection between Kant's deontologism and Rousseau's sentimentalism: the link emerges when we realize that aesthetic beauty, which is the norm that Rousseau presses toward in his sentimentalism, is, like Kantian virtue, an embodiment of the good which has no purpose beyond itself. Warnock also fails to see that Kant was more than dimly aware of the fact that Reason is realized Freedom; and consequently his disparaging reference to Kant's rationalism is ill-conceived.--E. A. R. (shrink)

This is the Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy for 1967. Interestingly enough the previous year's Lecture, by G. J. Warnock, was also on Kant's moral theory. Körner is a bit more reverential toward his subject than Warnock, but not too much more. In particular, he criticizes Kant's exclusion of freedom from the realm of phenomena. This is a familiar criticism but Körner does not merely state it. He firms it up by offering a different account of the relation between (...) categoreal and phenomenal intelligibility. Kant regarded the latter as simply an expression, albeit confused, of the former: science, with an assist from transcendental logic, could be expected to recapitulate exhaustively the intelligibility of phenomenal experience in categoreal and, most importantly, deterministic terms. Körner's account of the relation between these two forms of intelligibility stresses, on the contrary, the logical discontinuity between the two. In the language of contemporary philosophy of science, the relation between experience and theory is instrumental. Körner has developed his basic argument more clearly and sophisticatedly in the last two chapters of his Experience and Theory, and his application in this lecture of its essentials to Kant, although certainly appropriate, is not very smooth. It is cluttered up with a lot of miscellaneous observations which could be harmonized in a longer study of Kant but only tend to distract here.--E. A. R. (shrink)

In a recent article in Religious Studies , Gregory S. Kavka argues that John Hick was wrong when he said that the statement ‘God exists’ is verifiable but not falsifiable. Kavka constructs an imaginary `resurrection world' ruled by Satan and inhabited by such resurrected evildoers as Hitler and Stalin. In such a world, those who had been virtuous in earthly life in the hopes of a Christ-dominated resurrection world discover that virtue is inversely rewarded, with the ‘living’ intolerable for them (...) and worst of all for those among them who had lived especially virtuous lives, i.e. the saints. Further, they are told by presumably knowledgeable inhabitants of this world that: …the historical Christ was an agent sent by Satan to raise in good people false hopes of eternal salvation. This story is confirmed by Satan himself who demonstrates through a huge telescope-like device how he continues to send false saviours to other planets inhabited by intelligent beings in a cruel plan to make such beings miserable in the long run. (shrink)

Books reviewed in this article: The Bible and Postmodern Imagination: Texts Under Negotiation. By Walter Brueggemann. In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Post‐Modern World. By Jerome A. Miller. Interpreting Hebrew Poetry. By David L. Petersen and Kent Harold Richards. Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament, Volume I: Aαρωυ‐Eυωχ. Edited by Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneiders. The Secretary in the Letters of Paul. By E. Randolph Richards. Revelation. By Wilfrid J. Harrington. Conversion to Christianity: Historical and (...) Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation. Edited by Robert W. Hefner. The Metaphor of God Incarnate. By John Hick. Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion. By John Hick. The Nature of God. By Gerard J. Hughes. The Animals Issue: Moral Theoy in Practice. By Peter Carruthers. Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages. By G. R. Evans. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy. By Simo Knuuttila. Da Descarres a Spinoza: Percorsi della teologia razionale nel seicento. By Maria Emanuela Scribano. Tra Descartes e Bayle: Poiret e la teodicea. By Gianluca Mori. Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical. By Anthony Rudd. Kierkegaard on Art and Communication. Edited by George Pattison. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan Volume 10: Topics in Education. Edited by Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe. A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation‐building and Human Rights. By Charles Villa‐Vicencio. Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics. Edited by Paul F. Camenisch. Theological Developments in Bioethics. Edited by Andrew Lustig et al. Marriage in the Western Church: The Christianization of Marriage During the Patristic and Early Medieval Periods. By Philip L. Reynolds. Marriage in the Early Church. Translated and edited by David G. Hunter. The Clash of Gods: A Reinterpretation of Early Christian Art. By Thomas F. Mathews. A History of Religion in Britain: Practice and Belief from Pre‐Roman Times to the Present. Edited by Sheridan Gilley and W. J. Sheik. The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power and Religious Belief in Early Modern France. By Michael Wolfe. English Polemics at the Spanish Court: Joseph Creswell's ‘Letter to the Ambassador from England’, The English and the Spanish Texts of 1606. Edited by Albert J. Loomie. (shrink)

George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue-answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)-but rather how do religions represent, at (...) least in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well being and flourishing. (shrink)

Pharmacogenomics is a quickly evolving field of research that increasingly impacts individuals and society. As some innovations in biotechnology have experienced strong public opposition during the 1990s, interaction between producers and users of these innovations may help in increasing their success in social and economic terms. However, conditions for effective interaction have so far remained under-explored. This paper explores user-producer interactions in pharmacogenomics from an innovation and science communication perspective in the Netherlands. To find possible ways of engaging stakeholders in (...) an early stage of technology development, ie, when science policy is in the making, we present communication activities derived from the field of policy analysis. To articulate motives for two-way public participation in genomics innovation processes, we describe two levels at which pharmacogenomics developments will have an input:1) at the meso-level of medical practice with already established medical technologies, values and routines, suppliers and health professionals (general practitioners, pharmacists), and 2) at the macro-level of society at large, with established institutions, infrastructures, and broadly shared values and beliefs among citizens in general. Thereby we offer a starting point for optimising decision-making processes in the field of pharmacogenomics innovations, including important aims to be reached, stakeholders to be involved, and some criteria for designing interactive communication activities. (shrink)

Amongst the people who pester Peisthetaerus with unwanted help and advice in the latter part of the Birds is Meton, famous astronomer and mathematician, who produces and demonstrates with instruments a method of laying out the plan of the new town. Peisthetaerus makes no attempt to follow him and quickly bundles him out again without much ceremony. Commentators and readers with few exceptions treat him in a similar way. ʹΕπίτηδες δανόητα, δόλου νοηταίνε, παίζε—such are the comments of the scholiast, and (...) editors are mostly content with that. Van Leeuwen says, ‘Metonis haec verba intellegere velle, id est operam dare ut suo ioco frustretur cbtnicus.’ The passage is of course highly comical; to make it didactic and attribute to Aristophanes a serious excursion into geometry and town-planning would be perverse and pedantic; but in Aristophanes more than in most comic writers there is commonly a grain or two of truth among the chaff. These grains, though of little or no importance for the appreciation of the play as comedy, may still have some possible value in other ways, and should be carefully sifted. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

It is argued that a radical relocation of subjectivity began several thousand years ago. A subjectivity experienced in the centric region of the heart, and in the body as a whole, began to be avoided in favor of the eccentric head as a new location of subjectivity. In ancient literature, for example in Homer's epics, the heart and various other bodily organs were described as centers of subjectivity and organs of perception for spiritual experience and communion with others and the (...) world. Mind and body were integrated. Bur also in the early historical record, as in the Old Testament, the heart and body were increasingly described as rebellious and rejected as impure. Head and heart, mind and body, became estranged. The body was judged an unsuitable, impure vessel for spiritual experience. This change in the location of subjectivity presaged the later development of Platonic, Gnostic, Christian, and Cartesian distinctions favoring mind over and against the body. It may also have contributed to some of the characteristic psychological and pathological processes (e.g., psychosomatic illnesses, repression, narcissism) currently attributed to the psychology of the modern Western, and specifically, North American self. (shrink)

This distinction has sometimes been read as purely epistemic, resting not on things, but on our knowledge of them: there is one world, not two, though it may be apprehended in two ways. But this view is patently at odds with the text. Knowledge and opinion are δυνάμεις, "faculties," to be distinguished and defined by their objects, no less than by the state of mind they produce, and Plato clearly states that the fallibility and unclearness of opinion is rooted in (...) the relative unreality of opinables. (shrink)

J. Krishnamurti (1895-1986) was thought by many to be a modern-day equivalent of the Buddha. In fact, he was once even considered to be the second coming of Christ. While many think it wonderful to live and work in close proximity with such a person, it's difficult to understand the depth of what this means and how challenging this might be. In Knocking at the Open Door, author R.E. Mark Lee provides an ordinary person view of what being close-up and (...) working together with such a man means, how it challenges one at every turn, and how it causes one to question ceaselessly, even more deeply than one ordinarily would. Lee offers an insightful, candid, and heartfelt narrative that reveals various unknown facets of the eminent world teacher J. Krishnamurti and highlights his distinctive vision for education worldwide. This comprehensive volume brings alive the practical and everyday interactions Lee had with Krishnamurti during a twenty-year period in India and the United Sates. Knocking at the Open Door shares a clear and honest account that demonstrates the challenges of working with Krishnamurti in running a school that is true to the teaching and yet able to function in the reality of modern parental, student, and educational establishment expectations. (shrink)

This study represents an improvement in the ethics scales inventory published in a 1988 Journal of Business Ethics article. The article presents the distillation and validation process whereby the original 33 item inventory was reduced to eight items. These eight items comprise the following ethical dimensions: a moral equity dimension, a relativism dimension, and a contractualism dimension. The multidimensional ethics scale demonstrates significant predictive ability.

Si bien la importancia de Avicena como fuente del pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino es generalmente reconocida, los detalles de esa dependencia apenas comienzan a trabajarse. Este artículo se ocupa de las enseñanzas de Avicena en lo que respecta a los “sujetos” de las ciencias teoréticas —física, matemáticas y metafísica— tal y como se presentan en la Introducción al Libro de la Curación. Posteriormente, se muestra su influencia en el comentario de Tomás de Aquino al De trinitate, de Boecio, q. (...) 5, art. 1. A través de una comparación entre Avicena y Tomás se muestra la profunda influencia que tuvo Avicena en la comprensión tomista del rango de las tres clases de ciencias teoréticas. (shrink)

While the importance of Avicenna as a source of Aquinas’s thought is generally recognized, the details of that dependence are just now being worked out. This article presents Avicenna’s teaching on the “subjects” of the theoretical sciences—physics, mathematics, and metaphysics—as presented in his Introduction to the Book of Healing. Its influence on Aquinas’s commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate, q. 5, art. 1, is then presented. Comparing Avicenna with Thomas in this way shows the profound influence of Avicenna on Thomas’s understanding (...) of the range of the three kinds of theoretical sciences. (shrink)

The development of virtue ethics in the contemporary philosophical world, as a reaction to various forms of consequentialism, deontology, and moral skepticism, has now brought forth translators determined to offer the wisdom of pre-moderns to contemporary readers. Here is a “small work” of Denis , the “last of the scholastics” and a contemporary of humanists like Ficino and Erasmus, who opened the modern age that is now rapidly closing. Educated in “the way of Thomas Aquinas” at the University of Cologne, (...) the Carthusian cloister allowed him leisure to become a prolific author, often cited by Catholics during the Protestant Reformation.He should be rescued from obscurity, for here he weaves together the vices and virtues in a way that eluded even Aquinas. In the spirit of the age, his audience was the ordinary layman. Denis brought Thomistic materials together with Scripture and the Fathers, using the Neoplatonic circle made famous by his namesake, Dionysius the Areopagite. Book One charts how sin pushes us ever deeper through the seven deadly sins. Then Book Two follows the workings of grace and nature in producing progress in virtue. Especially insightful is the way Denis uses Plotinus to. (shrink)

Here, I should like to tell a story, beginning with how the works of Aristotelian philosophy came to exist in Latin translations, then moving to the project of transforming Christian theology into an Aristotelian “science.” After that, I would like to look a bit more closely at the case of Br. Thomas of Aquino and his dependence upon the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā. Finally, I shall end by drawing some wider conclusions based upon this important example.

The first chapter discusses the association of the English word ‘or’ in reasoning. “Or” is descended from the Anglo-Saxon word meaning second, a form which survives in such expressions as “every other day.” If logical theory had not introduced the vocabulary of disjunction, we could not formulate the question. The truth-functional character of ‘or’ and ‘and’, if they have such a character in their natural language habitat, is a character that is derived as a consequence of their playing a certain (...) role in discourse, one best described as punctuation, or in a specialized sense of the word adverbial. In many cases, the transformation of a sentence embedding an or-list to an equivalent or joined pair of sentences cannot plausibly be called disjunctive distribution. ‘Or’-words derive from additive rather than from subtractive ancestors. (shrink)

This chapter describes logic and the significance of punctuation to ‘or’ in a sentence. Axioms are primitive theorems. This is what is meant by ‘logic’, and in particular, a propositional logic is one that can be specified. Deontic logicians are by no means unanimous about their point of formal departure: whether it is the language of ‘ought’ and ‘may’ or the language of ‘obligation’ and ‘permissibility’. The punctuationist account takes ‘or’ as providing punctuation for lists and asks why we should (...) punctuate a list with ‘or’ in certain contexts when we want it to receive a conjunctive reading. ‘Or’ can be replaced by ‘else’ or ‘otherwise’, ‘or’ is a relative adverb as well. ‘Or’ can be regarded as a modifier of a whole sentence. (shrink)

This chapter examimes relevance to misunderstandings about the meaning of aut and possible meanings of ‘or’. In spite of what has been said about the notion of form, there is no harm in applying the word ‘formal’ to the Stoics' work. By some standards, it is not informal, and by those standards, we may therefore call it formal where it is the contrast intended. Since the substitution account of validity would not rule out such disjunctions and a descriptive account would, (...) the descriptive account seems on that score to be the more likely candidate for the Stoic conception of validity. Boole also took exclusivity, even the same arity-free idea of exclusivity, to be centrally important to his representation, but the exclusivity was constructed out of a non-exclusive disjunctive use of ‘or’. (shrink)